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Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract
Essay1: The future compatibility of a product can be important to a buyer. With IT products, switching costs may in the worst cases well exceed
the purchasing price. We develop a model in which rational buyers value products by their expected levels of future compatibility, using
suppliers' R&D budget levels as signals. Suppliers compete by investing in R&D to increase compatibility. In all the analysed market scenarios
R&D investment levels fall short of the social optimum. Welfare closest to optimum is reached when suppliers collude in R&D but compete in
product markets.
Essay 2: Suppliers invest strategically in order to develop the future compatibility of products whereas buyers value the products in terms of the
expected levels of future compatibility. One supplier has an information disadvantage of being uncertain of the competitor's unit cost. He tries to
infer it from the other supplier's observed level of compatibility R&D investment. We show that the duopoly game satisfies the requirements for
a unique separating signalling equilibrium and that the resulting level of R&D investment is higher than for a full information scenario.
Incomplete information leads to a reduced level of welfare in numerical examples. The behaviour described helps to explain the open
announcement of R&D activities in the IT-industry.
Essay 3: A large and increasing population of programmers is engaged in the development of freely distributed software. Its members receive
little direct compensation for their work but instead a novel licensing scheme - copyleft - creates an incentive structure reminiscent of science
based on complementary income. We build a model where the occupational choice of programmers determines the quality of programs in the
consumer market. A monopolist, supplying the consumer market, has to take into account the impact the free software has on the market. When
software implementation costs are low the monopolist will accept the presence of the copyleft program in the market. Our model explains the
simultaneous presence of commercial and free copylefted programs in the market and also why there may not exist commercial alternatives to
copyleft programs.
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